CONTEMPORARY RESPONSES TO THE OPEN-QUESTION ARGUMENT
Keywords:
open-question argument, naturalistic fallacy, Moore, Comell realists, Kripke, Putnam, Horgan, TimmonsAbstract
George Edward Moore's Principia Ethica is one of the most influential works in the field of ethics. The significance of Principia lies in the fact that it led to the creation of a new subdiscipline of ethics - metaethics. The centra! place in Principia occupies the problem of, what is nowdays known as, the 'naturalistic fallacy' and 'the open-question argument'. This paper will present contemporary responses to the open question argument and the directions in which the metaethical debate on this question has been developing.
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