In defense of internal justification

Abstract

In this paper I present the basic ideas behind two conceptions of epistemic justification that are most often contrasted in contemporary epistemology: internalism and externalism. Internalism, as defined and defended by philosophers such as M. Steup, R. Feldman and E. Conee, goes back to Plato’s idea that justification has to ground a belief in the believer, or provide a believer with reasons for accepting his belief. This places a heavy demand – a demand that is most probably unfulfillable - on the cognizer: one needs to know that his belief is justified in order to have knowledge. On the other hand, externalism, the most famous advocator of which is A. Goldman, tries to escape this demand by placing the justification entirely out of cognizer’s reach: in the reliability of the process that generated a belief. Although both of these positions have problems of their own and do not manage to provide us with a satisfactory account of justification, it is argued that internalism does more justice to the notion of justification and to the role we assign to it.